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This paper analyzes military retirement reform; comparing the current retirement plan, 
HI-3 adjusted annually by CPI-W, to proposals that change base retirement pay and/or 
COLA indexing.  The proposed changes to base retirement pay are a HI-4 or HI-5 plan 
and changes to COLA indexing are to use Chained CPI or CPI minus 1 percent. The 
plans were modeled to estimate the present value from the perspective of the government 
and retiree.  By implementing HI-4 or HI-5 Chained CPI the government can save an 
estimated $0.3 to $1.7 billion per retiree cohort, respectively, and would result in an 
average loss to the present value to the retiree of $5,000 to $88,000.  The government is 
indifferent if either Chained CPI or CPI minus 1 percent plan is implemented as either 
plan offers equal savings.  The method used to adjust COLA effects officers and enlisted 
differently with officers preferring CPI minus 1 percent and Chained CPI preferred by 
enlisted retirees.  However, Chained CPI has a lower loss of present value to the 
individual than CPI minus 1 percent when averaged over a retiree cohort.   
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Over the past couple of years there has been an initiative from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to decrease overhead and increase efficiency in the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD) business operations. This initiative began in 2010 
because of impending decreases to the DOD’s budget in the coming years (Defense 
Business Board, 2011). In order to meet these initiatives of decreased overhead and 
increased efficiency, several studies and reform proposals have been completed on the 
military retirement system. The studies have recommend a wide variety of options for 
military retirement reform ranging from keeping the system unchanged, to simple 
modifications to the current system, and to a complete overhaul from a defined benefit to 
a defined contribution plan (Henning, Military Retirement Reform: A Review of 
Proposals and Options for Congress, 2011). 
The reform of military compensation is still a top priority of the Secretary of 
Defense (SecDef) and the United States Congress (Pellerin, 2013). The SecDef reiterated 
this priority in his opening letter of the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2014 stating “that 
we must reform Military compensation in a responsible way” (Department of Defense, 
2014) The SecDef’s statement echoed the actions of the United States Congress. 
Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which changed the way cost-of-
living adjustment (COLA) is calculated. However, this was changed by S. 25 in February 
2014 to apply only to members entering the military after December 31, 2013 (S. 25, 
2014).  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to quantitatively analyze, using present value (PV), 
the value of military retirement. The PV is calculated for the current military retirement 
plans and the following purposed changes:  
 Final Pay Index using High Four Years of Pay (HI-4) or High Five Years 
of Pay (HI-5) 
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 Annual Pay increase equal to Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus 1 percent 
from date of retirement until age 62 years. After age 62, payments are 
restored to the same value as if they grew at the CPI rate from the date of 
retirement and continue to increase at the rate of CPI.  
 Annual Pay increase equal to Chained CPI from date of retirement until 
age 62. After age 62, payments are restored to the same value as if they 
grew at the CPI rate from the date of retirement and continue to increase at 
the rate of CPI.  
My research uses the data produced from the quantitative analysis to measure the 
impact of these changes to valuation by individual service members, and the DOD across 
several ranks and years of service, at date of retirement.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What is the change in value to individual retirees from the current retirement plan 
to retirement plans with a change in final pay and/or COLA indexing? 
2. Secondary Question 
Does the change in final pay and/or COLA indexing change an individual’s 
greatest retirement value depending on when individual chooses to retire considering 
their promotion date, rank, and years of service at date of retirement? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
I review prior military retirement reforms and their implementation. I use this 
historical data as a foundation for the changes being proposed. The analysis of proposed 
changes is limited to the retirement system for active duty officers and enlisted personnel 
only and does not address any changes to either disability retirement or reserve officer 
and enlisted retirement payments. An individual’s choice of when to retire is based upon 
many different variables. This thesis will only take into account the valuation of the 
different retirement plans as a factor which affects individual’s choice of when to retire.  
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E. METHODOLOGY 
I used a mathematical model based on PV to calculate the values of the current 
retirement system and the proposed changes to final pay and COLA indexing. These 
values are computed and compared across different ranks, promotion dates, and years of 
service at date of retirement. Chapter III discusses the methodology in greater detail.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter II gives a history of military retirement, the various reforms, and the 
current system. It also discusses the proposals that are used in the mathematical model.  
Chapter III describes the methodology used for the mathematical model in 
calculating NPV for the various proposals. The determination of constants and variables 
for the mathematical model is discussed. Finally, the assumptions and limitations of the 
mathematical model are stated.  
Chapter IV details the results calculated from model. This includes calculations, 
comparison between the proposals, and interpretation of the results.  
Chapter V gives recommendations based on historical and analytical analysis of 
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II. HISTORY OF U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND CHANGE 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details the history of the military retirement system from its 
beginnings in colonial times to the present day. Current military retirement system plans 
are then reviewed in detail. Finally, the proposals analyzed in my thesis: HI-4, HI-5, 
Chained CPI, and the Bipartisan Budget Act are discussed.  
B. OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
This section relies heavily upon the DOD Office of the Actuary report from 2014 
entitled Valuation of the Military Retirement System. 
1. Beginnings 
Initially, military pensions were based on whether or not the member became 
disabled and can be traced back to English pension law. The pilgrims at Plymouth were 
the first colonials to provide a pension to soldiers. In 1636, the pilgrims would provide 
for a soldier maimed in battle for the duration of his life. The first national pension law in 
1776, promised half pay for life, or the duration of disability. The first national pension 
law was initial administered by each individual State administered until, in 1790, pension 
administration was taken over by the Secretary of War (DOD Office of the Actuary, 
2014). 
The first pension based on service alone, regardless of disability or need, was 
promised by the U.S. Congress in 1780 for officers who served to the end of the 
Revolutionary War. Congress promised half pay for life (DOD Office of the Actuary, 
2014). The promise was not fully fulfilled, however, and pension claims were settled for 
less than full value. As the number of living veterans from the war started to decline, 
Congress progressively increased the value of the pension. In 1818, an act was passed to 
provide Revolutionary War veterans relief if in need; in 1832, this became full pay for 
life regardless of need, and, in 1836, widows were included (DOD Office of the Actuary, 
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2014). The administration of military pensions was transferred to the newly created 
Department of the Interior in 1849. The Department of the Interior would continue to 
administer pensions until the establishment of the Veterans Administration in 1930 (DOD 
Office of the Actuary, 2014). 
2. Civil War to World War II 
The changes to the military retirement system that started during the Civil War 
were enacted to shape the military force. It became necessary to retire older officers who 
could not perform their duties in the field. The means to accomplish this was the act of 
August 3, 1861, allowing the voluntary retirement of offices from all branches after 40 
years of service, at the discretion of the president. This was the first major retirement act 
not based on disability (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). It was later modified to also 
allow for retirement based on age (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). 
In 1870, Congress established the voluntary retirement of officers after 30 years 
of service at 75 percent of pay, in order to facilitate a peace time drawdown, post-Civil 
War. For the first time, retirement payment was established at a value of 2.5 percent for 
each year of service. During this peace time drawdown, the first nondisablity retirement 
was established for enlisted personnel and had the same provisions as the retirement 
established for officers in 1870 (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). 
World War I brought about retirement changes to help shape the force, primarily 
in the Navy. The large influx of Naval officers and the limited ability to retire officers 
resulted in a stagnation of promotion. To alleviate this problem, promotion selection 
boards were established for promotion to Rear Admiral, Captain, and Commanders 
starting in 1916. Eligibility for the selection boards was first based on the the service 
members’ age and rank (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). In 1926, the eligibility 
criterion was changed to time of service in grade. Members not picked up for promotion 
were retired with a pension of 2.5 percent per year of service, not to exceed 75 percent, 
regardless of years of service. After World War I, the Navy continued to experience 
stagnation of promotion. In 1938, the solution to this stagnation was to expand the 
promotion board selection process to all grades above Lieutenant, add maximum years of 
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service for Lieutenant Commanders to Captains, and lower the voluntary retirement to 20 
years of service (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). 
3. World War II to 1980 
After World War II, the military retirement system began to resemble its i present 
structure. In 1947, the Army and Air Force implemented a promotion selection process 
similar to that established by the Navy in World War I. It established a severance package 
for officers not selected for promotion. The severance was set at two months’ pay 
multiplied by number of years of service, and not to exceed a total of two years of pay. 
One year later, for the first time ever, the Army and Air Force Vitalization and 
Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 unified military retirement compensation among all 
Services. The act also reduced severance pay to one month’s pay per year of service, not 
to exceed one year’s pay (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
2005).   
After all services were unified under the same retirement system, the system did 
not undergo any major changes for the next 30 years. It incurred some changes to how 
retired pay was increased over time (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). Initially, retired 
pay increases were linked to active duty pay increases. In 1958, the method to increase 
retired pay was changed to a COLA increase of 6 percent This increase was roughly the 
increase in cost-of-living since the last time retirement pay was increased, in 1955 (DOD 
Office of the Actuary, 2014). This led to the first automatic yearly increase to retirement 
pay based on the increase in cost-of-living, in 1963 (Uniformed Services Pay Act, 1963). 
In 1965, the formula was modified again, to grant an increase in pay if the CPI increased 
by 3 percent for at least 3 months in a row (Uniformed Services Salary increase, 1965). In 
1977, COLA increases were scheduled to occur twice a year, in March and September, 
with the increase equal to the percentage increase in CPI from the previous June to 
December and December to June, respectively (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). Pls 
continue to give citations for data from here onward 
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4. 1980 to Present 
The first retirement reform to change base retirement pay, since the Army and Air 
Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 was enacted in December of 
1980 with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. This changed the formula for 
retirement pay from final pay to the average of the highest 36 months of pay multiplied 
by 2.5 percent and then multiplied by years of service (DOD Office of the Actuary, 
2014).  
From 1977 to 1984, several changes to COLA calculations occurred. These 
changes involved changing the timing and number of increases that occurred per year. In 
April of 1984, P.L. 98–270 established COLA increases equaled the percent increase in 
the average of the CPIs of July, August and September over the average of the same three 
months from the previous year (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014).  
The Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 changed the formula for retirement, 
also called the Redux formula. This formula is covered in greater detail later in this 
chapter. In 1999, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 
established the Career Status Bonus (CSB). This converted individuals who joined after 
July 31, 1986 back to the HI-3 formula with the option at 15 years of service to elect to 
stay on the HI-3 formula or take a lump sum bonus and convert to the Redux Formula 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2005). The cap to not exceed a 
multiplier of 75 percent was removed in 2006 by the John Warner National defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.  
Between 1981 and 2000, a substantial increase in basic pay occurred. This was 
done to bridge the difference between military and civilian compensation (DOD Office of 
the Actuary, 2014). The increases in basic pay have a direct impact on the increase in 
retirement pay, because retirement pay is a function of basic pay.  
The most recent retirement change took place in December of 2013 with the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. This act changed the formula for the COLA calculation, 
and will be detailed later in the chapter (Bipartisan Budget Act, 2013). 
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C. CURRENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM  
1. Final Pay Plan 
For individuals who joined the military prior to September 8, 1980 they are 
subject to the Final Pay Plan. Under this plan the retiree must complete a minimum of 20 
years of service to be eligible for retirement pay. The retirement payment is calculated 
using the retiree’s final basic pay multiplied by 2.5 percent and then multiplied again by 
number of years of service. The retirement pay is also protected from inflation with an 
annual COLA increase equal to CPI (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2005).  
2. HI-3 Plan 
The HI-3 Plan was implemented for military members who joined the service 
after September 7, 1980. This plan is identical to the Final Pay Plan in all aspects with 
one exception. Instead of using final basic pay in the retirement calculation it uses the 
average of the highest 36 months of basic pay. This legislation was enacted because of 
concerns of over increasing retirement cost (Department of Defense, 1984).  
3. Redux/CSB 
The Redux retirement plan was introduced in July of 1986 and any individuals 
joining after July 31, 1986, are covered by this plan. The retired pay formula under 
Redux uses the same basic principle as the HI-3 and Final Pay plan, the retired base pay 
multiplied by a multiplier. The Redux formula used the same method as the HI-3 formula 
in the calculation of retired base pay, the average of the highest 36 months of base pay. 
The changes in the Redux plan involve the multiplier, COLA, and age of the retiree.  
For the first 20 years of service each year is credited with 2 percent for a total 
multiplier of 40 percent. The next 10 years of service are credited at a rate of 3.5 percent. 
Any years of service after 30 years are credited at 2.5 percent. COLA increases are 
calculated by taking CPI minus 1 percent. At age 62 there is a re-computation of the 
retirement payments. The payment is set to equal the payment that would have been 
received under the HI-3 plan with COLA increases equal to CPI. However; after this 
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onetime adjustment the COLA increase reverts back to CPI minus 1 percent (Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2005). Table 1 displays the multiplier 







Before Age 62 After Age 62 
20 50.0% 40.0% 50.0% 
21 52.5 43.5 52.5 
22 55.0 47.0 55.0 
23 57.5 50.5 57.5 
24 60.0 54.0 60.0 
25 62.5 57.5 62.5 
26 65.0 61.0 65.0 
27 67.5 64.5 67.5 
28 70.0 68.0 70.0 
29 72.5 71.5 72.5 
30 75.0 75.0 75.0 
31 77.5 77.5 77.5 
32 80.0 80.0 80.0 
33 82.5 82.5 82.5 
34 85.0 85.0 85.0 
35 87.5 87.5 87.5 
36 90.0 90.0 90.0 
37 92.5 92.5 92.5 
38 95.0 95.0 95.0 
39 97.5 97.5 97.5 
40 100.0 100.0 100.0 
41 102.5 102.5 102.5 
42 105.0 105.0 105.0 
Table 1.   Military Retirement System Multipliers (from DOD Office of 
the Actuary, 2012) 
In 1999, Congress concluded that the lesser benefits from the Redux option would 
lead to lower retention and poor morale based on testimony from the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(Nordman, 2012). Congress decided to transition members who were governed by the 
Redux plan into the more generous HI-3 plan. To help offset the increased costs 
associated with transitioning retirees to the HI-3 plan, Congress allowed the individual to 
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choose between HI-3 or receive a $30,000 bonus, at their 15 years of service. If the CSB 
was selected it was paid immediately and the individual was converted to the Redux plan. 
Once the individual made this decision it could not be changed. This is what is known as 
the CSB/Redux plan. If a member elected to take the CSB they are required to serve until 
they reach 20 years of service or forfeit the CSB (Philpott, $30,000 Knife Cuts Careerists 
Retirement, 2004). Since instituting the CSB/Redux plan, overall 38 percent of members 
choose CSB/Redux plan with 42 percent of enlisted personnel and only 7 percent of 
officers choosing the plan (Cunha & Menichini, 2014). 
4. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 has brought about the most recent changes to 
the military retirement system. This act changed the way that COLA is calculated over 
the period of the annuity. The multiplier for retired base pay is the same as the HI-3 plan. 
If the retiree is under the age of 62 the COLA increase is equal to CPI minus 1 percent, 
the same as the CSB/Redux plan. Once the retiree reaches the age of 62 at the next 
adjustment of COLA the member will receive the same adjustment that members under 
CSB/Redux receive; however, unlike CSB/Redux further COLA increases will be equal 
to CPI. This change is scheduled to take effect on December 1, 2015 (Bipartisan Budget 
Act, 2013). 
Amidst outcry from veterans’ groups and others over the Bipartisan Budget Act’s 
annual cut to COLA, Congress revisited the decision of decreased annual COLA 
(Associated Press, 2014). On February 15, 2014, P.L. 113–82 changed the COLA 
reduction by making it applicable to members that joined on or after January 1, 2014, 
thus grandfathering all existing members.  
D. PROPOSALS 
1. HI-4 and HI-5 
The proposal to use HI-4 or HI-5 is a modification to the existing plan to use the 
average of the highest 48 months and highest 60 months of basic pay, respectively. This 
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would be a cost cutting effort (Concepts for Modernizing Military Retirement, 2014) 
similar to the one enacted in 1980 under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.  
2. Chained CPI 
CPI is the measurement of inflation computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). CPI is utilized by a number of federal programs for annual COLA increases. CPI 
is calculated by measuring the change in the cost of goods and services, defined as the 
market basket represents average consumer spending. A major limitation to CPI is that 
the market basket used in the index is based on spending patterns in the past. By using 
spending patterns in the past, the index does not incorporate the effects of economic 
substitution. Economic substitution states that as the price in good A increases the 
demand for good B increases because good B is cheaper. The CPI calculation uses the 
comparison between the current and historical price of good A. The actual cost of living 
increase would be the historical cost of good A compared to the current cost of good B. 
Because of this substation, CPI grows faster than the actual cost of living does 
(Meyerson, 2010).  
Because of this limitation to CPI, the BLS developed a new statistic called the 
Chained CPI. This statistic avoids the bias of substitution from month to month by using 
the market baskets from both months. This produces a lower estimate of inflation by an 
average of 0.3 percentage points than the consumer price index – wage (CPI_W) 
(Meyerson, 2010).  
In 2010, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) proposed to use Chained CPI 
instead of CPI-W for the indexing of COLA. The investigation evaluated the possible 
cost savings, if the switch was implemented. The report concluded that indexing inflation 
to Chained CPI in the tax code would reduce budget deficits by $90 billion over 10 years. 
If the same was done for Social Security and Federal Retirement outlays over 10 year 
would be reduced by $108 and $23 billion, respectively (Meyerson, 2010).  
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E. SUMMARY 
The military retirement system began as a necessity to compensate service 
members who were injured in times of war so that they could provide for themselves and 
their families. Over time the retirement system evolved into a defined benefit for service 
and ultimately a tool used to shape the force structure. Military retirement is considered a 
significant factor in retaining a career military force (Henning, Military Retirement 
Reform: A Review of Proposals and Options for Congress, 2011). The military retirement 
system has only seen minor changes since the mid-1900s by changing how COLA is 
applied, retired base pay, or the multiplier. These changes were implemented either 
because of fiscal constraints or force shaping needs.  
Today members of the military fall under one of four military retirement plans: 
Final Pay, HI-3, Redux/CSB, or Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. Three plans to reform 
military retirement were discussed: HI-4, HI-5, and Chained CPI. These reform plans are 
not complete reforms, but are modifications to the current system. This follows the 









Chapter III details the methodology used, NPV, description and assumptions for 
the variables in the calculation of NPV, and the inputs and outputs of the model. 
The scope of the model only includes active duty officers and enlisted personnel. 
It does not include reservist, disability retirement, warrant officers, and prior-enlisted 
members receiving an officer commission.  
B. NET PRESENT VALUE 
My three main goals are to determine the difference in value to the service 
member and the cost to the DOD between the new policies that have been proposed and 
the current retirement system. To accomplish the valuation of the retirement system, the 
NPV method is utilized. NPV is the summation of the present value of individual cash 
flows for a project/investment. Therefore, the higher the NPV, the more favorable the 
option is to the service member and the inverse is true to the DOD as it represents a cost. 
NPV accounts for the time-value of money: the notion that a dollar today does not 
have the same value as a dollar tomorrow. See Figure 1 for the present value formula and 
Figure 2 for the future value formula; these are the formulas used to account for the time-
value of money, where Ct is the cash payment, r is the rate of return, and t is the number 








Figure 1.  Present Value Formula 
 1 ttFV C r   
Figure 2.  Future Value Formula  
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These formulas are used on the each payment the service member receives from 
the individual’s retirement benefit. If the payment occurs after the retiree’s date of 
retirement, the present value formula is used and if it occurs before their retirement date 
the future value formula is used.  
Figures 3, 4, and 5 display the timeline of payments for the different retirement 
plans discussed in Chapter II. For all three figures the retirement payments are in monthly 
increments, Cb is the base retirement pay, and i is the inflation indexing factor. The 
formulas in the diagrams are explained in detail later in the chapter.  
Figure 3 shows the cash flows for the HI-3, HI-4, and HI-5. These three 
retirement plans pay the member a monthly cash flow with a COLA increase equal to 
inflation once per year. This cycle continues until the death of the retiree.  
 
Figure 3.  Cash Flows for HI-3, HI-4, and HI-5 
The cash flow for the Bipartisan Budget Act retirement plan is shown in Figure 4. 
It is the same as the cash flows for the HI-3, HI-4, and HI-5 plans with the exception of 
how COLA is indexed until the retiree turns 62. Prior to the retiree turning 62, the annual 
COLA increase is equal to CPI-W minus 1 percent. At age 62, the retirement payment is 
set equal to as if annual COLA increase equaled inflation. After this catchup payment, the 
annual COLA increases are equal to CPI-W.  
Retirement 
Date 
3 2 1 12 13 24 





Figure 4.  Cash Flows Bipartisan Budget Act 
Figure 5 is the cash flow diagram for the Redux/CSB retirement plan. The 
diagram shows the onetime payment of the CSB at 15 years of service. Upon retirement, 
the retiree’s retirement plan behaves exactly as the Bipartisan Budget Act Plan, until after 
62. When the retiree turns 62, the individual receives the same catchup, as in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act, to their retirement payment. After the catchup, annual COLA 




Figure 5.  Cash Flows Redux/CSB 
Once all of the individual payments are calculated, NPV can be calculated for 
each retirement plan, using the equation in Figure 6.  
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     
Figure 6.  NPV Equation 
The formula is the cash at time zero, C0, and the summation of the individual cash 
flows discounted back to time zero. Time zero is equal to the date of retirement. For all 
retirement plans, with the exception of Redux/CSB, C0 is equal to zero. C0 for the 
Redux/CSB option is the CSB received at 15 years of service with the value computed at 
date of retirement using the future value formula in Figure 2.  
C. VARIABLES 
This next section defines the variables used in the PV calculations. The 
assumptions used in calculating the variables will also be stated.   
1. Cash Flows: Cb, Ct, and Ct 
This section explains the three cash flows in the PV calculations, base retirement 
pay, increases to base retirement pay, and the initial cash flow. 
a. Base Retirement Pay: Cb 
Base retirement pay is the initial retirement payment, and it is calculated using the 
formula in Figure 7. In Figures 3, 4, and 5 base retirement pay is represented by Cb.  
retirement pay basepay * multiplier   
Figure 7.  Retirement Pay Formula 
Base pay is a function of rank and years of service. Rank and years of service are 
used to determine active duty base pay. This base pay is used to calculate the average of 
the high 36, 48, or 60 months of pay for the HI-3, HI-4, and HI-5 models respectfully. 
The multiplier is a function of years of service. Depending on the retirement plan, each 
year of service is credited with a certain percentage. These percentages are discussed in 
Chapter II, and are displayed in Table 1.  
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I used the ranks of O-6, O-5, O-4, E-9, E-8, E-7, and E-6 when computing base 
pay. As of 30 September 2012, these ranks accounted for 92 percent of personnel that 
retired in fiscal year 2012 and 86 percent of all military retires. Table 2 shows the number 
of retirees by rank (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014).  
 
Rank FY2012 Total 
O-6 2,105 69,824 
O-5 3,058 124,288 
O-4 1,994 9,228 
E-9 1,974 85,399 
E-8 4,833 193,501 
E-7 10,328 470,797 
E-6 5,561 308,616 
Other 2,711 210,434 
Total 32,564 1,472,087 
Table 2.   Number of Retirees by Rank (from DOD Office of the 
Actuary, 2012) 
In order to ensure that average base pay is calculated accurately, a promotion date 
for the above ranks was established. This is to account for change in active duty base pay 
if the service member was promoted within the previous 36, 48, or 60 months from the 
individual’s date of retirement. The minimum years of service for promotion are listed in 
Table 3.  
The minimum years of service is 20 years, since this is the required time for the 
retirement plans to vest. If the years of service for promotion for a rank is greater than 20, 
the years of service at promotion is used as the minimum years of service Also, each rank 
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has a maximum years of service based on high year tenure set by law. These minimum 
and maximums are shown in Table 3.  
Rank Promotion Max 
O-6 22 30 
O-5 16 28 
O-4 10 20 
E-9 21 30 
E-8 18 26 
E-7 15 24 
E-6 11 20 
Table 3.   Years of Service by Rank (after Department of Defense, 
2009; Powers, 2006; Department of Defense, 2012; Defense Officer 
Personnel Management Act, 1980) 
b. Increases to Base Retirement Pay: Ct 
The retirement plans are protected from inflation. The cash flow diagrams in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show when and how these increases occur. For all of the plans the 
increase is calculated by multiplying retirement base pay by an inflation factor. The 
increase to the base retirement pay occurs in December of every year. The HI-3, 
Bipartisan Budget Act, and Redux/CSB retirement increase are captured using the 
formulas in figures 8, 9, and 10, respectively. Where i is an inflation factor, n is the nth 
time that an increase has occurred, and m is the mth time that an increase has occurred 
after age 62.  
 1 nt bC C i   
Figure 8.  HI-3 Retirement Pay Increase Formula 
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 1 0.01 nt bC C i    
Figure 9.  Bipartisan Budget Act Pay Increase Formula 
  621 (1 0.01)n mt bC C i i     
Figure 10.  Redux/CSB Pay Increase after Age 62Formula 
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 used a combination of the formulas in Figures 
8 and 9. Prior to the retiree reaching the age of 62 the formula in Figure 9 is used. After 
age 62  is reached by the retiree, the payments are calculated using the formula in Figure 
8. The Redux/CSB uses formula in Figure 9 to calculate payments prior to age 62 and the 
formula in Figure 10 after age 62.  
The inflation factor, i, is set to CPI-W, currently used by the retirement system, or 
Chained CPI, proposed change to the retirement system. The value for CPI-W used is 3.0 
percent, the 2014 DOD inflation assumption. This assumption is consistent with other 
government agencies and the average annual change in CPI for the past 32 years ending 
in 2012 of 2.97 percent (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014). The value for Chained CPI 
used in calculations is 2.7 percent. Chained CPI is a relatively new statistic with data 
dating to December of 1999. Since data is not available to obtain a 32 year average, a 
comparison of the percent change between each year of CPI-W and Chained CPI was 
done from 2001 to 2012. On average, CPI-W was 0.3 percent higher than Chained CPI 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). This difference was subtracted from the 3.0 percent 
that is used for CPI-W to obtain the 2.7 percent value for Chained CPI.  
c. Initial Cash Flow: C0  
The initial cash flow is only utilized for the Redux/CSB retirement plan. The 
formula in Figure 2 is used to calculate the value of the $30,000 at the date of retirement. 
In the formula r is the rate of return which is equal to the discount rate discussed in the 
next section. Setting the rate of return equal to the discount rate was done to reflect the 
personal time-value of money even though a higher rate of return may be achieved 
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through investments. t is the number of months between 15 years of service and date of 
retirement.  
2. Discount Rate: r  
Discount Rate is the rate which future cash payments are discounted to the 
present. When discounting cash flows, the discount rate does not only account for the 
time-value of money, but also the risk or uncertainty of future payments. The inclusion of 
the risk premium makes the discount rate a personnel choice as people have different risk 
tolerance. As a simple example, you expect to receive $1000 one year from now and the 
discount rate is 10  percent the value of the $1000 to you today would be $909.09, but 
someone else is less risk adverse and has discount rate of 5 percent the value would be 
$952.38. 
Since the discount rate is a personal choice, a sensitivity analysis was done a 
range of discount rates. The range for this analysis is 0 percent to 20 percent. The lower 
bound represents money being equal regardless of time and the upper bound is the higher 
end of personnel discount rates (Cunha & Menichini, 2014).  
There are two perspectives for the value of military retirement: the retiree and the 
government. The difference in these perspectives is the choice of the discount rate. For 
the retiree, Cunha and Menichini estimated personal discount rates the average for 
officers 6.49 percent and enlisted 10.05 percent (Cunha & Menichini, 2014). The 
government uses a discount rate of 5.50 percent. The 5.50 percent assumes a real interest 
rate of 2.50 percent, historical trend of government trust fund earnings, and the inflation 
rate of 3.00 percent discussed earlier (DOD Office of the Actuary, 2014)  
The retirement payments are paid out monthly, so it is assumed that the discount 
rate is compounded monthly. When using the formulas in Figure 1 and 2, r is divided by 
12 and t is in terms of months.  
3. Time of Cash Flow: t 
The variable t is the time interval at which the cash flow is paid. It starts at time 
interval one, first retirement payment, and ends at the nth interval at the service member’s 
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death. In order to determine the nth interval two assumptions were made; the age the 
service member joined the service and the service member’s life expectancy. It is 
assumed that individuals join the military at age 18 for enlisted service and at age 22 for 
commissioned service. The four year difference is caused by the requirement for officers 
to obtain a bachelor degree. Table 4 displays the life expectancy used by the DOD. The 
average life expectancy for an officer is 84.25 years and for enlisted is 79.75 years.  
  
 Officer Enlisted 
Male 84 79 
Female 84.5 80.5 
Table 4.   Military Retiree Life Expectancy (from DOD Office of the 
Actuary, 2012) 
Utilizing these assumptions, the calculation for nth payment is shown in Figure 
11.  
 Nth Life Expectancy Age Joined + Service Time   
Figure 11.  Nth Payment Formula 
D. MODEL, INPUTS, AND OUTPUTS 
The model was built using MATLAB. MATLAB was chosen because it is a 
programming language that allows for numerical computation, visualization, and 
programming. It allows for matrix manipulation, making the generation and comparison 
of different scenarios easier. The formulas and assumptions discussed earlier were built 
into a mathematical model using MATLAB in order calculate retirement values for 
different scenarios. The mathematical model code is in Appendix B.  
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An input matrix was created to build the different scenarios that were analyzed. 
Figure 12 shows the input matrix for the model. The input matrix was comprised of many 
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Figure 12.  Inputs to the Model 
Figure 13 displays the output matrix of the model. Each row in the matrix 
corresponds to one of the retirement plans being analyzed and each column of the matrix 
corresponds to the scenario in the same column as the input matrix. The output matrix is 
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This chapter explained NPV and how it was used to build the mathematical model 
used to calculate the value of retirement systems over a variety of scenarios. The 
variables used in the model were defined and the assumptions behind those definitions 
are explained. Finally the rational for choosing the program used to create the 
mathematical model and how it was used to create the different scenarios for comparison 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results from the PV calculations for the retirement 
compensation proposals discussed in Chapters II and III. The savings to the government 
and the value lost to the individual retiree is examined. The effects of discount rate, 
promotions, rank, and years of service have on the retiree’s retirement are considered. 
Finally, recruiting and retention issues are discussed.   
B. VALUATION 
The base valuation used for comparison is the HI-3 retirement plan. As stated in 
Chapter II, in the current retirement system the HI-3 is chosen at a rate of 62 percent 
amongst retirees. Also, amongst the proposed alternatives the HI-3 plan has the highest 
valuation because each alternative either reduces base retired pay, COLA, or both. 
Table 5 displays the estimated valuation of the HI-3 plan in millions of dollars for 
one year’s worth of retirees based on FY 2012 retirement numbers (DOD Office of the 
Actuary, 2013). The total number of retirees used was 25,755 with 5,827 officers and 
19,928 enlisted. A breakdown by rank and years of service is in Appendix A. The 
government is concerned with the total amounts under the government discount rate 
because this is what the government estimates that it will have to spend. The individual is 
concerned with the amount per retiree using the retiree discount rate because this is what 





  Officer  Enlisted  Total  Officer  Enlisted  Total 
Total  $8,195   $14,065   $22,260   $7,023   $7,465   $14,488  
Per Retiree  $1.41   $0.71   $0.86   $1.21   $0.37   $0.56  
Table 5.   HI-3 Valuation in Millions of Dollars 
The difference in valuation between the government and the individual is due to 
different discount rates. The government uses a discount rate of 5.50 percent, and the 
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retiree discount rates used are 6.49 percent for officers and 10.05 percent for enlisted. As 
discussed in Chapter III, the rates reflect estimates for the average discount rates for 
officers and enlisted. The larger difference in valuation between the government and 
enlisted retiree is because of the larger variation in discount rate with the enlisted retiree 
rate being approximately twice that of the governments.   
Table 6 shows the difference from the HI-3 plan, as presented in Table 5, for each 
of the proposed retirement plans for one year’s worth of retirees. The savings to the 
government is the aggregate PV of HI-3 minus the PV of the proposed plan at the 
government discount rate. The savings are shown in millions of dollars. The loss of value 
to the individual is the average decrease in PV to each retiree and is shown in thousands 







   Officer  Enlisted  Total  Officer  Enlisted  Total 
HI‐3, CPI‐1%  $249   $703   $953   $38   $19   $24  
HI‐3, Chained  $345   $608   $953   $47   $11   $19  
HI‐4  $119   $200   $319   $17   $5   $8  
HI‐4, CPI‐1%  $365   $894   $1,258  $55   $24   $31  
HI‐4, Chained  $459   $800   $1,258  $64   $16   $27  
HI‐5  $294   $465   $758   $43   $12   $19  
HI‐5, CPI‐1%  $534   $1,145   $1,679  $80   $31   $42  
HI‐5, Chained  $626   $1,053   $1,679  $88   $23   $38  
Redux  $479   $1,037   $1,516  $67   $(3)  $13  
Table 6.   Change in Valuation for Retirement Plans: Savings to 
Government in Millions of Dollars and Loss to Individual in Thousands 
of Dollars 
By implementing one of the plans in Table 6, the government can save an 
estimated 0.3 to 1.7 billion dollars per retiree cohort. The savings seen by the government 
will result in an average loss of value to the retiree of $5,000 to $88,000. The $3,000 
average increase for enlisted who chose Redux/CSB is misleading because only 40 
percent of the enlisted retirees would receive an increase in retirement value. The reason 
why only 40 percent of enlisted retirees benefit from Redux/CSB but the average is a 
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gain in retirement value is because of the large variation in Redux/CSB value. The two 
extremes under the Redux/CSB plan are an E-6 that retires with 20 years of service, and 
an E-9 with 30 years of service would receive a decrease of $46,000 and an increase of 
$120,000 in retirement value, respectively. Since the enlisted Redux/CSB average is an 
increase, for every E-9 that retires with 30 years of service, an average of 2.5 E-6s with 
20 years of need to retire to offset the increase, a ratio of 40 percent.    
An additional observation from Table 6 is that the smallest savings to the 
government and smallest loss of value to the retiree occur when retired base pay is 
decreased. The largest savings occur when there is a change to the COLA indexing. This 
is because of the power of compounding interest. Also the savings to the government for 
the Chained CPI or CPI minus 1 percent models are equal in total value but differ in how 
they affect officer and enlisted retirees. However, Chained CPI and CPI minus 1 percent 
are not equal in loss of value from the retiree’s perspective. Figures 14 and 15 display the 
value of the different retirement plans verse years of service for an O-5 at a discount rate 
of 5.5 percent and Figures 16 and 17 are at the same discount rate for an E-7. The figures 
reinforce the savings trends displayed in Table 6.   
 
















Figure 15.  O-5 Change in COLA Index at 5.5 percent Discount rate 
 





































Figure 17.  E-7 Change in COLA Index at 5.5 percent Discount Rate 
From the perspective of the government, plans that use Chained CPI are more 
favorable for officers and those that use CPI minus 1 percent are more favorable for 
enlisted. This relationship is seen in Figures 18 and 19, the difference from HI-3 for an 
O-5 and E-7, respectively. A higher value in these figures represents greater loss of value 
























Figure 18.  O-5 Difference from HI-3 at 5.5 percent Discount Rate 
 






















































In Figure 18, the difference from HI-3 for retirement plans that use Chained CPI 
increases and CPI Minus 1 percent plans decrease as years of service increase. The same 
relationship is seen in Figure 19, however, Chained CPI plans start with smaller 
difference from HI-3 than the CPI minus 1 percent plans.   
The first factor that causes the difference between officer and enlisted Chained 
CPI and CPI minus 1 percent relationship is enlisted members retire at a younger age on 
average. The earlier retirement age, of an enlisted member, results in more COLA 
increases being calculated at the lower CPI minus 1 percent rate. Secondly, the lower life 
expectancy, for enlisted members, 80 years of age verse 84 years of age for an officer. 
The lower life expectancy results in 48 fewer payments after age 62, when the CPI minus 
1 percent plan is adjusted to equal the HI-3 plan and continue to increase annually at CPI. 
Finally, the difference in discount rates contributes to this relationship. Enlisted members 
have a higher discount rate on average than officers, resulting in a lower PV for future 
payments.   
C. INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the preference for all retirees would be the 
HI-3 plan. This section will discuss different scenarios that would change the retiree’s 
preference between the alternatives. The figures in this section show the difference from 
the HI-3 plan, thus a lower PV difference equates to a PV.   
1. Discount Rate 
As discussed in Chapter III, an individual’s discount Rate is a personal preference 
and varies. Figure 20 and 21 show how the difference from HI-3 changes with respect to 
the discount rate for an O-5 and E-7, respectively, both with 20 years of service. In both 
figures, as the discount rate increases above 15 percent value of the plans become more 
with the exception of Redux/CSB. Redux/CSB continues to increase in value because of 
the CSB, which increase in value as discount rate increases.    
For an O-5 retiring with 20 years of service, every retirement option at some 
discount rate has a greater valuation than at least one other option. The exception being 
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that the HI-4 plan is always a superior option as seen in Figure 20. At a discount rate of 
6.0 percent is when Chained CPI becomes a better option than CPI minus 1 percent 
options when compared using the same base retirement pay calculation, i.e. HI-4 to HI4.  
 
Figure 20.  O-5 with 20 Years of Service Difference from HI-3 vs Discount Rate 
 



























































For an E-7 the point at which Chained CPI becomes a better option than CPI 
minus 1 percent is at a discount rate of 3.5 percent. Also HI-5 is the second best option 
until a discount rate of 10 percent. 
2. Rank and Years of Service 
Rank and Years of Service have an impact on which plan would be the best 
choice for an individual. For all ranks HI-5 Chained and HI-5 CPI minus 1 percent result 
in a lower PV than the other plans for the individual with the exception of E-7. For an E-
7, HI-5 Chained CPI has a higher PV than HI-4 CPI minus 1 percent at all years of 
service. For officers, HI-5 CPI minus 1 percent results in a higher PV than HI-4 Chained 
CPI when the retiree is closer to their high year tenure. Enlisted Retirees see a higher 
value for HI-5 Chained CPI at the first year of retirement eligibility.   
Figures 22 and 23 graph the difference from HI-3 for the different retirement 
plans for an O-6 and E-9, respectively. Both of these graphs display trends that occur 
across all ranks.   
In Figure 22, the retiree was promoted to O-6 at 22 years of service. The plans 
that use HI-4 or HI-5 loses value compared to HI-3 for the first three years, as shown by 
the increase in the difference between the plans and HI-3. For the first three years after 
promotion, HI-3 average increases at a faster rate because it uses fewer years to calculate 
base retirement pay, resulting in fewer years at the lower pay grade being included in the 
average. After the three years, the HI-3 rate of increase slows because the average is 
taken over one pay grade. At this point HI-4 and HI-5 regain the lost value because these 
plans base retirement pay are increasing at a faster rate. The HI-4 and HI-5 plans include 
pay at the lower rank in their calculation of retirement base pay. For the retirement base 
pay to only include the current rank, it takes an additional one year for HI-4 and two 
years for HI-5. 
Both Figure 22 and 23 displays a two year cycle of HI-4 and HI-5 gaining and 
losing value compared to HI-3. Active duty pay increases with every two years of 
service. So depending on the retirees years of service the HI-4 and HI-5 base pay 
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calculation may bridge between two or three of these pay increase, where the HI-3 plan 
will only bridge one or two of these pay increases.  
Another trend is that as the retiree’s rank increases the years of service for 
Redux/CSB to break even decreases. The graphs for O-5, O-5, E-8, E-7, and E-6 are in 
Appendix A. 
 


























Figure 23.  E-9 Difference from HI-3 at 10.05 percent Discount Rate 
Table 7 presents individual retirement values at 20 years of service for different 
ranks. E-9 and O-6 are at 21 and 22 years of service respectively since this is the average 
years of service required for promotion to these ranks.  
 
   E‐6  E‐7  E‐8  E‐9*  O‐4  O‐5  O‐6** 
HI‐3  $277   $324  $346  $380  $908  $1,006   $1,114  
HI‐3, CPI‐1%  $261   $305  $326  $359  $868  $962   $1,072  
HI‐3, Chained  $269   $314  $336  $369  $870  $964   $1,069  
HI‐4  $275   $320  $337  $372  $900  $994   $1,101  
HI‐4, CPI‐1%  $259   $301  $317  $351  $860  $951   $1,059  
HI‐4, Chained  $266   $310  $327  $361  $862  $953   $1,056  
HI‐5  $271   $314  $327  $365  $886  $962   $1,080  
HI‐5, CPI‐1%  $255   $296  $308  $344  $847  $920   $1,040  
HI‐5, Chained  $263   $304  $318  $354  $849  $922   $1,037  
Redux  $266   $303  $320  $362  $799  $881   $1,025  
Table 7.   Retirement Value at 20 Years of Service in Thousands of 
Dollars. 























D. ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION 
The implementation of any of the proposals would likely raise questions about 
enlistment and retention since all of the proposals have a value less than the current 
retirement system. Table 8 shows the decrease in value to the member as a percentage of 
the HI-3 value and a decrease in value received each month over an assumed 40 years of 





   Officer  Enlisted  Total  Officer  Enlisted  Total 
HI‐3, CPI‐1%  3.19%  5.11%  4.18%  $80   $40   $49  
HI‐3, Chained  3.89%  2.93%  3.39%  $98   $23   $40  
HI‐4  1.45%  1.42%  1.44%  $36   $11   $17  
HI‐4, CPI‐1%  4.59%  6.46%  5.56%  $115   $50   $65  
HI‐4, Chained  5.28%  4.31%  4.78%  $133   $34   $56  
HI‐5  3.58%  3.30%  3.44%  $90   $26   $40  
HI‐5, CPI‐1%  6.66%  8.25%  7.48%  $167   $64   $88  
HI‐5, Chained  7.33%  6.13%  6.71%  $184   $48   $79  
Redux  5.54%  ‐0.76%  2.30%  $139   $(6)  $27  
Table 8.   Percent Decrease and Monthly Value Decrease as Compared 
to HI-3 
From table 6, the DOD could save an estimated $953 million per cohort, by 
switching to HI-3 Chained CPI plan. An individual’s retirement value would have to take 
an average decrease of 3.39 percent to achieve this savings. The DOD could save an 
additional $300 million by switching to HI-4 Chained CPI plan and an additional 1.39 
percent decrease in average individual retirement value would be needed. This overall 
decrease is likely to lead to decreases in retention and enlistment.  
Also with O-6, E-9, and E-8, individuals may decide to stay in longer if a plan 
that calculates retirement base pay with HI-4 or HI-5 is chosen. When using HI-4 or HI-
5, the individual would need to stay one or two years longer, respectively, after a 
promotion than under the HI-3 plan in order to reduce the decrease in average retired 
base pay.  
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter compared the PV of the current retirement system to the proposals 
discussed in Chapter II. If the DOD were to implement one of these proposals it would be 
able to save an estimated $300 to $1700 million per year. Next the effects to individual 
retirees were analyzed. It was determined that the HI-5 Chained CPI and HI-5 CPI minus 
1 percent rarely outperformed any other plan from the retiree’s perspective but achieved 
the largest savings from the governments point of view. Also Chained CPI and CPI 
minus 1 percent plans affected enlisted and officers differently with enlisted preferring 
the Chained CPI plans, based off of PV. Promotions and the pay increases every two 
years have a greater impact on retirement value when using HI-4 or HI-5 compared to 
HI-3. Finally, a decrease in enlistment and retention might occur as the decrease in value 
exceeds some individuals opportunity cost threshold. Also, an individual’s choice on 
when to retire are likely to change if HI-4 and HI-5 plans are implemented due to the 


















My study was initiated to analyze the change in value from the current military 
retirement system to proposals that change retirement base pay and/or COLA. The PVs 
were calculated for each proposal and compared to the HI-3 retirement plan with a range 
of savings to the government from a low of $0.3 billion to a high of $1.7 billion 
implementing the HI-4 and HI-5 Chained CPI respectively. The individual retiree would 
see an average decease in retirement value from a low of 1.44 percent to a high 6.71 
percent using these proposals. The method used to adjust COLA affects officers and 
enlisted differently with officers preferring CPI minus 1 percent and Chained CPI 
preferred by enlisted retirees.  
A second goal of my thesis was to evaluate the effects that promotion date, rank, 
and years of service at date of retirement have on an individual’s retirement value. When 
a retirement plan changed retirement base pay to HI-4 or HI-5 the promotion date and 
years of service had a greater impact on retirement value than HI-3. Also, an individual’s 
choice on when to retire will change if HI-4 and HI-5 plans are implemented due to the 
number of years used to calculate retirement base pay.  
A third goal was to evaluate the effects on enlistment and retention. Retention and 
enlistment would likely be negatively affected by switching to one of the proposals 
because all plans result in a decrease of value to the individual. The analysis on retention 
effects was limited because present value is the sole factor considered.  
In order to balance savings to the government and loss of value to the individual, I 
suggest that DOD should implement a plan that uses Chained CPI. The savings to the 
government is the same using Chained CPI or CPI minus 1 percent and the average loss 
of value to the individual retiree is less using Chained CPI. I also suggest that the DOD, 
in conjunction with Chained CPI, should use HI-4 or HI-5 proposals. The DOD would 
save an estimated maximum of $1.7 billion dollars per retiree cohort at an average loss of 
value to the retiree of 6.71 percent.  
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The scope and assumptions made in my study address a majority of military 
retires. In order to understand the full effects of implanting the proposals further study 
would have to be done for reservists, prior enlisted, warrant officers, and disability 
retirement. My thesis uses the retirement value as the sole factor an individual considers 
when they decide to retire. This is a simplification of that decision process and other such 
as job stressors, quality of life, etc. need to be included to understand the true magnitude 
of effect that switching the retirement system would have on the retirement decision.  
Results from my thesis also produced additional opportunities for further study. 
With different proposals in my study affecting groups of retirees differently, a study on 
the feasibility and practicality of switching from a one size fits all retirement benefit to a 
system that allows for personal choice or targets specific groups of retirees would be 
beneficial. Finally, the savings occurred by switching COLA to Chained CPI 
demonstrated the large savings that can be achieved with a simple change. This begs the 
question of what savings could be achieved if the DOD or all U.S. government agencies 








APPENDIX A. SUPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
A. TABLE 
YOS O-6  O-5  O-4  E-9  E-8  E-7  E-6 
20 0  988  1133  0  1032  4012  4163 
21 0  498  0  60  501  1600  0 
22 69  483  0  73  489  1350  0 
23 86  309  0  74  394  1034  0 
24 148  214  0  92  416  1740  0 
25 217  129  0  134  399  0  0 
26 288  117  0  183  1062  0  0 
27 276  82  0  158  0  0  0 
28 187  96  0  179  0  0  0 
29 149  0  0  161  0  0  0 
30 358  0  0  622  0  0  0 
Totals 1778  2916  1133  1736  4293  9736  4163 
Table 9.   Retirees by Rank and Years of Service 
B. FIGURES 
 

























Figure 25.  O-4 Difference from HI-3 at 20 Years of Service 
 







































Figure 27.  E-8 Difference from HI-3 at 10.05 percent Discount Rate 
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    pg = vars(1,x);             % pay grade at retirement 
    sm = vars(2,x);             % number of months of service 
    promotion = vars(3,x);      % month of last promotion 
    d = vars(4,x);              % discount rate 
    mr = 1;                     %month of retirement 
    cpi = 0.03;                 %cpi rate 
    chained = 0.027;            %chained cpi 
    bm = 0.025;                 % percentage per year of service 
 
 
    [pay3,pay4,pay5]=pay(pg,sm,promotion,mr); 
    
[hi3(x),hi4(x),hi5(x),rd(x)]=finalpay(pay3,pay4,pay5,pc09,pc10,pc11,pc12,pc13,pc14,bm,sm)
; 
    
[installments,paymentnumber]=payments(hi3(x),hi4(x),hi5(x),rd(x),sm,pg,cpi,chained,mr); 
    [total] = npv(installments,paymentnumber,d,sm); 
 
    npvx(:,x) = total; 
 






%this fuction selects the input matrix 
if x == 1 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','O6'); 
elseif x==2 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','O5'); 
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elseif x==3 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','O5Discount'); 
elseif x==4 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','O4'); 
elseif x==5 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','E9'); 
elseif x==6 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','E8'); 
elseif x==7 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','E7'); 
elseif x==8 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','E7Discount'); 
elseif x==9 
    vars=xlsread('variables.xlsx','E6'); 
else 
















%this function calculates the pay chart, paygrade and years of service for 
%each month need to calculate monthly retirement pay for 2014 for hi-3, 
%hi-4, and hi-5. it returns an array with the first column being paychart, 
%second column paygrad, and third column being years of service 
 
q = pg; %holder for intial pg 
 
for z = 1:3 
    if z == 1 
        y = 36; 
    elseif z==2 
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        y = 48; 
    else 
        y = 60; 
    end 
 
 
    for n = 1:y 
        x = sm-(n-1); %total months of service working backwards 
 
        %this section is used to select the appropriate pay table and returns 
        %it to column one of pay5 
        if n<=mr 
            chart = 14; 
        elseif n<=mr+12 
            chart = 13; 
        elseif n<=mr+24 
            chart = 12; 
        elseif n<=mr+36 
            chart = 11; 
        elseif n<=mr+48 
            chart = 10; 
        else 
            chart = 9; 
        end 
 
        if z == 1 
            pay3(n,1)= chart; 
        elseif z==2 
            pay4(n,1)= chart; 
        else 
            pay5(n,1)= chart; 
        end 
 
 
        %changes paygrade if member was promoted in last 36 months and puts 
        %paygrade into column 2 of pay5. 
        if x == promotion 
            pg = pg+1; 
        else 
            pg = pg; 
        end 
 
        if z == 1 
            pay3(n,2)= pg; 
        elseif z==2 
            pay4(n,2)= pg; 
        else 
            pay5(n,2)= pg; 
        end 
 
 
        %checks years of service for corrcet pay ammonut and puts into column 
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        %3 of pay5 
 
        s = x/12;  %converts months to years 
        if s > 40 
            pay = 14; 
        elseif s > 38 
            pay = 13; 
        elseif s > 36 
            pay = 12; 
        elseif s > 34 
            pay = 11; 
        elseif s > 32 
            pay = 10; 
        elseif s > 30 
            pay = 9; 
        elseif s > 28 
            pay = 8; 
        elseif s > 26 
            pay = 7; 
        elseif s > 24 
            pay = 6; 
        elseif s > 22 
            pay = 5; 
        elseif s > 20 
            pay = 4; 
        elseif s > 18 
            pay = 3; 
        elseif s > 16 
            pay = 2; 
        else 
            pay = 1; 
        end 
 
        if z == 1 
            pay3(n,3)= pay; 
        elseif z==2 
            pay4(n,3)= pay; 
        else 
            pay5(n,3)= pay; 
        end 
    end 
    pg=q; %resets pg for next loop to original 
end 
E. FINALPAY.M 
function [hi3,hi4,hi5,rd] = finalpay(pay3,pay4,pay5,pc09,pc10,pc11,pc12,pc13,pc14,bm,sm) 
%This fuction computes the monthly pay for retirement 
 
%finds retirement multiplyer 
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ys = sm/12; 
fm = ys*bm; 
 
%hi-3 calculation 
paycum3 = 0; %set up placeholder 
for x =1:36 
    pay = pay3(x,:); 
    if pay(1) == 14 
        mpay = pc14(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 13 
        mpay = pc13(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 12 
        mpay = pc12(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 11 
        mpay = pc11(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 10 
        mpay = pc10(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 9 
        mpay = pc09(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    end 
    paycum3 = paycum3 + mpay; 
end 
hi3 = paycum3/36*fm; 
 
%Redux Calculation 
if ys <= 30 
    rdm =0.4+(ys-20)*0.035; 
else 
    rdm =0.75+(ys-30)*0.025; 
end 
rd = paycum3/36*rdm; 
 
%hi-4 calculation 
paycum4 = 0; %set up placeholder 
for x =1:48 
    pay = pay4(x,:); 
    if pay(1) == 14 
        mpay = pc14(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 13 
        mpay = pc13(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 12 
        mpay = pc12(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 11 
        mpay = pc11(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 10 
        mpay = pc10(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 9 
        mpay = pc09(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    end 
    paycum4 = paycum4 + mpay; 
end 




paycum5 = 0; %set up placeholder 
for x =1:60 
    pay = pay5(x,:); 
    if pay(1) == 14 
        mpay = pc14(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 13 
        mpay = pc13(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 12 
        mpay = pc12(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 11 
        mpay = pc11(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 10 
        mpay = pc10(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    elseif pay(1) == 9 
        mpay = pc09(pay(2),pay(3)); 
    end 
    paycum5 = paycum5 + mpay; 
end 
hi5 = paycum5/60*fm; 
F. PAYMENTS.M 
function [installments,paymentnumber] = payments(hi3,hi4,hi5,rd,sm,pg,cpi,chained,mr) 
%calulates payments payed out to the memeber over the life of their 
%retirement 
%returns the number of payments they will recieve and an array with the 
%actually monthly payments 
%the rows are as follows 
%row 1 - hi3 current 
%row 2 - hi3 cpi - 1% 
%row 3 - hi3 chained cpi 
%row 4 - hi4 current 
%row 5 - hi4 cpi - 1% 
%row 6 - hi4 chained cpi 
%row 7 - hi5 current 
%row 8 - hi5 cpi - 1% 
%row 9 - hi5 chained cpi 
 
%assumes officers joined at 22 and elisted joined at 18.  Ages are in 
%months 
ageO = 264; 
ageE= 216; 
lifeO = 84.5*12; 
lifeE = 80.5*12; 
 
if pg<=7 
    age = ageO; 
    life = lifeO; 
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else 
    age = ageE; 
    life = lifeE; 
end 
 
paymentnumber = life -(sm+age); % expected monthly payments made to retire 
secondcarrerpayments = 62*12-(sm+age); %number of payments until 62 
start = 12-mr; 
 
for x = 1:3; 
    if x==1 
        hin = hi3; 
        hicpi = hi3; 
        hichained = hi3; 
        t=0; 
    elseif x==2 
        hin = hi4; 
        hicpi = hi4; 
        hichained = hi4; 
        t=3; 
    else 
        hin = hi5; 
        hicpi = hi5; 
        hichained = hi5; 
        t=6; 
    end 
    %section produce the payments for orginial system 
    y = 1; %counter variable 
    for z = 1:paymentnumber; 
        if y < start; 
            installments(t+1,z) = hin; 
            y = y+1; 
        elseif y >= start + 12; 
            hin = hin*(1+cpi); 
            installments(t+1,z) = hin; 
            y = y-11; 
        else 
            installments(t+1,z) = hin; 
            y = y+1; 
        end 
    end 
 
    %section produces payments for cpi - 1% 
    y = 1; %reset counter variable 
    for z = 1:paymentnumber; 
        if z < secondcarrerpayments; 
            if y < start; 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
                y = y+1; 
            elseif y >= start + 12; 
                hicpi = hicpi*(1+cpi-0.01); 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
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                y = y-11; 
            else 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
                y = y+1; 
            end 
        else 
            hicpi = installments(t+1,z); 
            if y < start; 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
                y = y+1; 
            elseif y >= start + 12; 
                hicpi = hicpi*(1+cpi); 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
                y = y-11; 
            else 
                installments(t+2,z) = hicpi; 
                y = y+1; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
 
 
    %section produces payments for chained_cpi% 
    y = 1; %reset counter variable 
    for z = 1:paymentnumber; 
        if y < start 
            installments(t+3,z) = hichained; 
            y = y+1; 
        elseif y >= start + 12; 
            hichained = hichained*(1+chained); 
            installments(t+3,z) = hichained; 
            y = y-11; 
        else 
            installments(t+3,z) = hichained; 
            y = y+1; 
        end 




%calculates redux value 
y = 1; %reset counter variable 
rdpay = rd; 
for z = 1:paymentnumber; 
    if z < secondcarrerpayments; 
        if y < start; 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y+1; 
        elseif y >= start + 12; 
            rdpay = rdpay*(1+cpi-0.01); 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y-11; 
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        else 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y+1; 
        end 
    else 
        rdpay = installments(1,z); 
        if y < start; 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y+1; 
        elseif y >= start + 12; 
           rdpay = rdpay*(1+cpi-0.01); 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y-11; 
        else 
            installments(t+4,z) = rdpay; 
            y = y+1; 
        end 
    end 
end 
G. NPV.M 
function [npv] = npv(payments,paymentnumber,d,sm) 
%calulates NPV 
 
for x = 1:paymentnumber 
    npvp(:,x)=payments(:,x)/(1+d/12)^x; 
end 
npv = sum(npvp,2); 
 
lump = 30000; 
t = sm-(15*12); 




function [ npvd ] = diference(npvx) 
%finds the differenece between hi 3 and other plans 
 
for x = 2:size(npvx,1) 






% This fuction formats and writes the outputs to excel 
a = {'Months'; 
    'HI-3'; 
    'HI-3, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-3, Chained'; 
    'HI-4'; 
    'HI-4, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-4, Chained'; 
    'HI-5'; 
    'HI-5, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-5, Chained'; 
    'Redux'; 
    'differnce'; 
    'Months'; 
    'HI-3, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-3, Chained'; 
    'HI-4'; 
    'HI-4, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-4, Chained'; 
    'HI-5'; 
    'HI-5, CPI-1%'; 
    'HI-5, Chained'; 
    'Redux'}; 
 
b = num2cell([vars(2,:)/12; 
     npvx(1,:); 
     npvx(2,:); 
     npvx(3,:); 
     npvx(4,:); 
     npvx(5,:); 
     npvx(6,:); 
     npvx(7,:); 
     npvx(8,:); 
     npvx(9,:); 
     npvx(10,:); 
     zeros(size(npvx(1,:))); 
     vars(2,:)/12; 
     npvd(1,:); 
     npvd(2,:); 
     npvd(3,:); 
     npvd(4,:); 
     npvd(5,:); 
     npvd(6,:); 
     npvd(7,:); 
     npvd(8,:); 
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